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Abstract
This paper constructs a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining to study how
fluctuations in bargaining power affect the outcomes of negotiations. The paper deals
with the technical complexities that arise when modeling games in continuous time by
building strategy restrictions into the equilibrium definition. These restrictions select a
unique equilibrium, which is characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations.
This unique equilibrium corresponds to the limiting subgame perfect equilibrium of
discrete-time bargaining games with frequent offers.
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1 Introduction
In many real life negotiations the relative strength of the parties changes over time. While
one side might start bargaining from a strong position, bargaining power might change hands
as the negotiation proceeds. For instance, in wage negotiations the relative bargaining power
of firm and workers depends on the unemployment rate, a variable that fluctuates along with
the economic cycle. In legislative bargaining the ability of a political party to implement
its preferred policy depends on the number of seats it controls in Congress, a quantity that
moves over time together with the party’s political power and popularity. In mergers and
acquisitions the way in which the firms divide the gains from joint operations may also depend
on time-varying variables, such as market valuations and the general economic environment.
This paper introduces a model of bilateral bargaining to study how time-varying bar-
gaining power affects negotiation outcomes. The model’s key variable is an exogenous and
publicly observable diffusion process, which measures the player’s relative bargaining power,
and whose realization at each moment in time determines the identity of the player with pro-
posal power. The game is played in continuous time, and at each instant prior to agreement
the player with proposal power can make an offer to her opponent. There is no deadline, and
bargaining continues indefinitely until an offer is accepted.
I show that this continuous-time model has a unique equilibrium, which is characterized
by a system of ordinary differential equations. This tractable equilibrium characterization
allows me to study how different features of the environment affect bargaining outcomes. For
instance, I derive conditions under which more uncertainty about future bargaining power
benefits the weaker player.1
There are technical difficulties that arise when modeling games in continuous time (e.g.
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)). One difficulty in continuous time bargaining games is that
1The tractability of the model makes it amenable to a variety of extensions and applications. A pre-
vious version of this paper illustrates this by extending the model to study (i) political negotiations with
supermajority rules and (ii) horizontal take-overs in oligopolistic markets.
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subgame perfection doesn’t refine the set of equilibria as it does when the game is played in
discrete time. In discrete-time bargaining games the responder incurs a fixed cost of delay if
she doesn’t accept the current offer, since she must wait at least one time period to reach an
agreement. This fixed cost of delay imposes restrictions on the strategies that players use in
a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). In contrast, the responder does not face a fixed cost
of delay when the game is in continuous time, since she can accept a new offer within an
arbitrarily short time period. This leads to a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes.2
This paper deals with this multiplicity by building into the definition of equilibrium of the
continuous-time game the intuitive restriction that the responder always accepts offers equal
to her continuation payoff of waiting until she becomes proposer. I show that this additional
restriction selects a unique equilibrium.3 Moreover, this unique equilibrium corresponds to
the (also unique) limiting SPE of the discrete-time version of the bargaining game, when
players can make offers arbitrarily frequently.
The present paper relates to the literature on bargaining games in continuous time. Perry
and Reny (1993) construct a continuous-time bilateral bargaining game in which players
can strategically time their offers (see also Sakovics (1993)). Ambrus and Lu (2015) study
a continuous-time coalitional bargaining game with a fixed deadline in which players get
random opportunities to make proposals through a Poisson process. A common feature of
these models is the presence of restrictions on the timing of offers and counteroffers. In Perry
and Reny (1993) these restrictions appear in the form of waiting times and reaction times ;
i.e., players cannot make a new offer immediately after making a proposal, and must wait a
positive amount of time before replying to an offer. In Ambrus and Lu (2015) the restrictions
are at the heart of the model, since players can only make proposals when the Poisson process
hits. These restrictions allow these authors to sidestep the technical issues that arise when
2That subgame perfection does not refine the set of outcomes in continuous-time bargaining games is not
new. For instance, Bergin and MacLeod (1993) show that any division of the surplus can be supported as an
equilibrium outcome in a bargaining game in which players can take actions in continuous time.
3I use similar ideas in Ortner (2017a), where I study the problem of a durable good monopolist with
time-varying production costs.
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modeling bargaining games in continuous time, and bring the analysis closer to that of
discrete-time bargaining games. In contrast, the current model features no restrictions on
the timing of offers (besides the identity of the proposer), and proposes a novel way of dealing
with the technical difficulties inherent to continuous-time bargaining games.
Simsek and Yildiz (2014) also study a bilateral bargaining game in which the players’
bargaining power evolves stochastically over time. They study settings in which players have
optimistic beliefs about their future bargaining power, and show that optimism can give
rise to inefficient delays if players expect bargaining power to become more durable in the
future. Simsek and Yildiz (2014) analyze a discrete-time bargaining game, and focus on the
properties of the game’s limiting SPE with frequent offers.
2 Model
Players and preferences. Two players, i = 1, 2, bargain over how to divide a perfectly
divisible surplus of size 1; the set of possible agreements is {y ∈ R2+ : y1 + y2 = 1}. Time is
continuous and players can reach an agreement at any time t ∈ [0,∞). Both players are risk
neutral expected utility maximizers and discount future payoffs at the common rate r > 0.
The payoff that player i gets from receiving a (possibly random) share z ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus
at a (possibly random) time τ is E[e−rτz]. If players fail to reach an agreement in finite time
they both get a payoff of zero.
Relative bargaining power and bargaining protocol. The key variable of the model
is a publicly observable stochastic process, which measures the players’ relative bargaining
power and which I denote by xt. Let B = {Bt,Ft : 0 ≤ t < ∞} be standard Brownian
motion on the probability space (Ω,F ,P).4 Process xt evolves as a Brownian motion with
4Throughout the paper, the filtration Ft is assumed to be right-continuous: for all t ≥ 0, Ft = Ft+ :=
∩ε>0Ft+ε.
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Figure 1: Sample path of xt.
constant drift µ and constant volatility σ > 0, with reflecting boundaries at −1 and 1:
dxt = µdt+ σdBt,
if xt ∈ (−1, 1); if xt reaches either −1 or 1 it reflects back.5 6
At each time t ∈ [0,∞) before players reach an agreement, the value of xt determines
the identity of the proposer: player 1 makes offers at t if xt ≥ 0 and player 2 makes offers
if xt < 0. Suppose for instance that x0 ≥ 0. In this case player 1 is proposer from time 0
until time τ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : xt < 0}.7 At any moment until τ1, player 1 can make an offer
z ∈ {y ∈ R2+ : y1 + y2 = 1} to player 2. There are no restrictions on the number or timing of
offers that player 1 can make between t = 0 and τ1. If player 2 accepts an offer before τ1 the
game ends and each player collects her payoff. If player 2 does not accept an offer between
5In Ortner (2017b) I study a political bargaining game in which the parties’ popularity evolves as a
reflecting Brownian motion. See Harrison (1985) for a detailed analysis of diffusion processes with reflecting
boundaries.
6A previous version of this paper showed how the results below can be extended to cases in which xt
follows other stochastic processes.
7Note that time τ1 is a stopping time, since the filtration Ft is assumed to be right-continuous.
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time 0 and τ1, then player 2 becomes the proposer from τ1 until τ2 := inf{t > τ1 : xt ≥ 0}.
Bargaining continues this way, with players alternating in their right to make proposals until
a player accepts an offer. Figure 1 plots a sample path of xt.
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Outcomes and equilibrium notion. An outcome of this bargaining game is a pair (A, η),
where A ∈ A := {A ⊆ [−1, 1] : A is closed} is an agreement region and η : A → {y ∈ R2+ :
y1 + y2 = 1} is a function mapping the agreement region to the set of possible divisions of
the surplus.9 The agreement region A determines the set of values of the state variable xt
at which players reach an agreement: under outcome (A, η) players reach an agreement at
time τ (A) := inf{t ≥ 0 : xt ∈ A}. The function η(·) = (η1(·), η2(·)) gives the share of the
surplus that each player gets when they reach an agreement. The payoff that player i gets
from outcome (A, η) when the current relative bargaining power is x is
Vi (x) = E
[
e−rτ(A)ηi
(
xτ(A)
)∣∣x0 = x] (1)
In what follows, I will denote an outcome (A, η) as a triplet (A, V1, V2), with A ∈ A and with
Vi satisfying (1) for i = 1, 2.
Let T1 be the set of stopping times τ such that xτ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, let T2 be the set of
stopping times τ such that xτ ∈ [−1, 0].
Definition 1 An outcome (A, V1, V2) is an equilibrium if, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
Vi (x) = sup
τ∈Ti
E
[
e−rτ (1− Vj (xτ ))
∣∣x0 = x]∀x ∈ [−1, 1]. (2)
Fix an outcome (A, V1, V2), with Vi(x) = E
[
e−rτ(A)ηi
(
xτ(A)
)∣∣x0 = x] for i = 1, 2 and for
all x ∈ [−1, 1]. Outcome (A, V1, V2) is an equilibrium if, for i = 1, 2 and for all x ∈ [−1, 1],
8The results in this paper extend to settings in which xt follows a more general diffusion process of the
form dxt = µ(xt)dt+ σ(xt)dBt.
9The restriction that the agreement region A must belong to the set A is only to get rid of trivial
multiplicities - see footnote 12 in the Appendix.
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Vi(x) is equal to the value of the optimal stopping problem supτ∈Ti E [e
−rτ (1− Vj (xτ ))|x0 = x].
The idea behind definition 1 is that the responder should be willing to accept proposals
that give her what she expects to get by waiting until she regains the right to make offers. In
other words, the responder’s acceptance threshold must be equal to her expected continuation
value. Since a proposer never offers the responder more than her acceptance threshold, the
responder’s payoff should always be equal to her expected continuation value. Definition 1
implies that this will occur under any equilibrium outcome. Indeed, suppose x0 = x is such
that player i is the responder at t = 0 and let τ (0) := inf{t ≥ 0 : xt = 0}. Note that
τ (0) ≤ τ for all τ ∈ Ti when x0 = x. Equation (2) then implies that
Vi (x) = E
[
e−rτ(0)Vi (0)
∣∣x0 = x] , (3)
regardless of whether players reach an agreement when xt = x or not (i.e., regardless of
whether x belongs to the agreement region A or not).
On the other hand, when player i is proposer she takes player j’s acceptance threshold
Vj (x) as given. At each moment in time before she loses the right to make proposals, player
i has to decide whether to make an acceptable offer of Vj (xt) to her opponent and end the
bargaining (keeping 1− Vj (xt) for herself), or to delay the agreement until she can strike a
better deal. Definition 1 says that an outcome (A, V1, V2) is an equilibrium if the proposer
always finds it optimal to delay when xt /∈ A, and always finds it optimal to make an
acceptable offer when xt ∈ A.
On bargaining games played in continuous time. It is well known that there are
technical issues when modeling games in continuous time (e.g., Simon and Stinchcombe
(1989)). One of these difficulties is that subgame perfection has less bite in continuous-
time bilateral bargaining games than in their discrete-time counterparts. In discrete-time
bargaining games a` la Rubinstein (1982) the responder incurs a fixed cost of delay if she
rejects the current offer, since she must wait one period to reach an agreement. This fixed
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cost of delay imposes restrictions on the strategies that players use in a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE). In particular, in any SPE the responder will always accept offers that
leave her indifferent between accepting or waiting until she becomes proposer.
In contrast, the responder doesn’t face a fixed cost of delay when the game is in continuous
time, since she can always accept a new offer within an arbitrarily short time period. As a
result, in continuous time there are equilibria in which the responder doesn’t accept offers
equal to her expected continuation payoff of waiting until she becomes proposer. For instance,
in continuous time the outcome in which player 1 always gets the entire surplus, regardless
of the level of bargaining power, can be supported as an equilibrium. In this equilibrium
player 1 only accepts offers that give her the entire surplus when she is responder, and only
makes such offers when she is proposer. Against this strategy of player 1, player 2 can do
no better than to always offer her opponent the entire surplus when she is proposer, and to
accept offers that give her zero payoff when she is responder.10
In this paper, I deal with this multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes by building into the
definition of equilibrium the restriction that the responder always accepts offers equal to her
expected continuation value of waiting until she becomes proposer, just as in a SPE of a
discrete-time bargaining game.
3 Equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibria of the model in Section 2. As a first step, the following
result establishes that every equilibrium outcome must involve immediate agreement. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (Immediate Agreement) Let (A, V1, V2) be an equilibrium outcome. Then,
it must be that A = [−1, 1].
10Bergin and MacLeod (1993) formalize these ideas and construct equilibria of this class in a continuous-
time bargaining game.
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Define A∗1 := [0, 1], A
∗
2 := [−1, 0] and A∗ := [−1, 1]. Note that, for i = 1, 2, A∗i is the set
of values of x at which player i has proposal power. Recall that τ(0) = inf{t ≥ 0 : xt = 0}.
Corollary 1 Let (A, V1, V2) be an equilibrium outcome. Then, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
Vi (x) =
 1− Vj (x) if x ∈ A∗i ,E [e−rτ(0) (1− Vj (0))∣∣x0 = x] if x /∈ A∗i .
Corollary 1 provides a partial characterization of the payoffs that can arise in an equilib-
rium of this model: player i’s payoff when she is responder is given by the expected discounted
value of waiting until xt reaches 0 and getting 1−Vj (0) of the surplus at that point. On the
other hand, when player i is making proposals she immediately makes an acceptable offer to
her opponent, thus receiving a payoff of 1− Vj (x).
The next result builds on Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 and shows that there is a unique
equilibrium.
Theorem 1 There is a unique equilibrium outcome (A∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ). For i = 1, 2, V
∗
i (·) solves
rV ∗i (x) =
 µ(V ∗i )′(x) +
1
2
σ2(V ∗i )
′′(x) if x /∈ A∗i ,
r + µ(V ∗i )
′(x) + 1
2
σ2(V ∗i )
′′(x) if x ∈ A∗i ,
(4)
with (V ∗i )
′(−1) = (V ∗i )′(1) = 0, limx↑0 V ∗i (x) = limx↓0 V ∗i (x) and limx↑0(V ∗i )′(x) = limx↓0(V ∗i )′(x).
Equation (4) has the following interpretation. The left-hand side is player i’s payoff
measured in flow terms. When player i is responder, her flow payoff is equal to the expected
change in her continuation value, which is µ(V ∗i )
′(x)+ 1
2
σ2(V ∗i )
′′(x). When player i is proposer,
her flow payoff is equal to the flow rent r she extracts from her ability to make offers plus
the expected change in her continuation value. The boundary conditions at 0 imply that
V ∗i is continuous and differentiable on [−1, 1]. The boundary conditions at −1 and 1 are a
9
consequence of the process xt: since xt has reflecting boundaries, party i’s payoff becomes
flat as x approaches either −1 or 1.
Equation (4) has a unique solution satisfying the boundary conditions in Theorem 1,
given by
V ∗i (x) =
 aie−αx + bieβx if x /∈ A∗i ,1 + cie−αx + dieβx if x ∈ A∗i ,
where α = (µ +
√
µ2 + 2rσ2)/σ2, β = (−µ +√µ2 + 2rσ2)/σ2, and where (ai, bi, ci, di) are
constants determined by the four boundary conditions; see equation (A.6) in the Appendix
for the full expression of V ∗1 (x).
The last result of this section presents comparative statics of V ∗i with respect to the
volatility of bargaining power. Recall that A∗1 = [0, 1] and A
∗
2 = [−1, 0].
Definition 2 The bargaining environment is favorable for player 1 (for player 2) if µ ≥ 0
(if µ ≤ 0).
Proposition 2 Suppose the bargaining environment is favorable for player j. Then, for
i 6= j, V ∗i (x) is increasing in σ for all x ∈ A∗j .
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. When the bargaining environment is
favorable to the proposer, an increase in volatility raises the chances that the responder will
recover bargaining power. This improves the responder’s bargaining position, and allows her
to obtain a better deal in the negotiations. Figure 2 illustrates.11
11Using the equilibrium characterization in equation (4), it can also be shown that: (i) for all x player 1’s
(player 2’s) payoff is increasing (decreasing) in µ, and (ii) for all x the responder’s payoff is decreasing in r.
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Figure 2: Payoffs V ∗1 . Parameters: µ = 0 and r = 0.05.
4 Discrete-time game
In this section I study the discrete-time version of the continuous-time model in Sections 2 and
3. The goal is to show that the equilibrium of the continuous-time formulation corresponds to
the limiting subgame perfect equilibrium of the discrete-time bargaining game, when players
can make offers arbitrarily frequently.
The discrete-time game is as follows. Two players, i = 1, 2, bargain over how to divide a
perfectly divisible surplus of size 1. Time is continuous but players can only make offers at
points on the grid T (∆) = {0,∆, 2∆, ...}, where ∆ > 0 measures the time between bargaining
rounds. As in Sections 2 and 3, xt evolves as a Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility
σ > 0, with reflecting boundaries at −1 and 1.
The bargaining protocol is as follows. At any time t ∈ T (∆) the realization of xt deter-
mines the identity of the proposer: player 1 is proposer at time t if xt ≥ 0, and player 2 is
proposer at time t if xt < 0. The proposer makes an offer z ∈ {y ∈ R2+ : y1 + y2 = 1}. The
responder can either accept or reject the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, the game
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ends and players collect their payoffs. If the responder rejects the offer, the game moves
to period t + ∆. Players are risk neutral expected utility maximizers and share the same
discount factor e−r∆ (with r > 0).
Let Γ∆ denote the bargaining game with time interval ∆ > 0. Recall that A
∗
1 = [0, 1] and
A∗2 = [−1, 0]. The following result characterizes the unique SPE of Γ∆.
Theorem 2 For any ∆ > 0, Γ∆ has a unique SPE. In the unique SPE players reach an
immediate agreement.
For i = 1, 2, let V ∆i (x) denote player i’s SPE payoff at a subgame in which players
have not yet reached an agreement and in which current bargaining power is x. Then, for
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
V ∆i (x) =
 e−r∆E
[
V ∆i (xt+∆)
∣∣xt = x] if x /∈ A∗i ,
1− e−r∆E [V ∆j (xt+∆)∣∣xt = x] if x ∈ A∗i , (5)
The content of Theorem 2 can be described as follows. In a subgame perfect equilibrium
the responder only accepts offers that give her a payoff at least as large as her expected
continuation value of waiting one period. Knowing this, the proposer always makes the
lowest offer that the responder is willing to accept, and the game ends with an immediate
agreement.
The last result shows that the unique SPE of Γ∆ converges to the equilibrium in Theorem
1 as ∆→ 0.
Theorem 3 For i = 1, 2, V ∆i converges uniformly to V
∗
i as ∆→ 0.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose (A, V1, V2) is an equilibrium and assume by contradiction
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that A is a strict subset of [−1, 1]. Since [−1, 1]\A is open (because A ∈ A = {A ⊆ [−1, 1] : A
is closed}), there exists an open interval (y, y) ⊂ [−1, 1] such that (y, y) * A, so τ (A) > 0
whenever x0 ∈ (y, y).12 Define W (x) := V1 (x) + V2 (x) = E
[
e−rτ(A)
∣∣x0 = x], and note that
W (x) < 1 for all x ∈ (y, y). Thus, V1 (x) + V2 (x) < 1 for all x ∈ (y, y). But this implies
that, when xt ∈ (y, y), proposer i is better off offering Vj (xt) to her opponent (and obtaining
a payoff of 1 − Vj (xt) > Vi (xt) for herself) than delaying. Therefore, (A, V1, V2) cannot be
an equilibrium outcome.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let (A∗, V1, V2) be an equilibrium outcome. Equation (3) then
implies that, for all x /∈ A∗i ,
Vi (x) = E
[
e−rτ(0)Vi (0)
∣∣x0 = x] = E [e−rτ(0) (1− Vj (0))∣∣x0 = x] ,
where I used V1 (x) + V2 (x) = 1 for all x (which follows from Proposition 1). Finally,
Proposition 1 also implies that Vi (x) = 1− Vj (x) for all x ∈ A∗i .
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 1, I present two preliminary lemmas. For any
y ∈ (−1, 1), let τy := inf{t : xt = y}.
Lemma A1 Let g : R→ R be a bounded function, and let f(·) be the solution to
rf(x) = µf ′(x) +
σ2
2
f ′′(x). (A.1)
(i) If f ′(−1) = 0 and f(y) = g(y), then for all x ∈ [−1, y], f(x) = E[e−rτyg(y)|x0 = x].
(ii) If f ′(1) = 0 and f(y) = g(y), then for all x ∈ [y, 1], f(x) = E[e−rτyg(y)|x0 = x].
Proof. I prove part (i) of the Lemma. The proof of part (ii) is symmetric and omitted.
Suppose f(·) solves the differential equation and boundary conditions in the statement of the
12If I allow for agreement regions A that don’t belong to the set A, then there would be equilibrium
agreement regions of the form R\Z, where Z is a set of measure zero. The restriction to A ∈ A rules out this
(trivial) source of multiplicity.
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Lemma. By Ito’s Lemma, for all xt ∈ [0, y],
d(e−rtf(xt)) = e−rt(−rf(xt) + µf ′(xt) + σ
2
2
f ′′(xt)) + e−rtf ′(xt)σdBt
= e−rtf ′(xt)σdBt.
Since e−rtf(xt) = f(x0) +
∫ t
0
d(e−rtf(xt)), it follows that
e−rτyf(xτy) = f(x0) +
∫ τy
0
e−rsf ′(xs)σdBs. (A.2)
Note that
∫ t
0
e−rsf ′(xs)σdBs is a Martingale with expectation zero. The result follows from
taking expectations in both sides of (A.2) and noting that f(xτy) = f(y) = g(y).
An implication of Lemma A1 is that the function f(x) = E[e−rτyg(y)|x0 = x]. solves (A.1)
for all x ∈ [−1, y] and with boundary conditions f ′(−1) = 0 and f(y) = g(y), and solves
(A.1) for all x ∈ [y, 1] and with boundary conditions f ′(1) = 0 and f(y) = g(y).13
The following Lemma, which I use in the proofs of Theorem 1 and of Proposition 2,
studies properties of solutions to the ODE in equation (A.1).
Lemma A2 Let U be a solution to (A.1) with parameters (µ, σˆ) and with U ′′(x) > 0 for all
x, and let W be a solution to (A.1) with parameters (µ, σ˜), with σ˜ ≥ σˆ and with W ′′(x) > 0
for all x.
(i) If U(y) ≥ W (y) and U ′(y) ≥ W ′(y) for some y, with at least one inequality strict if
σ˜ = σˆ, then U ′(x) > W ′(x) for all x > y, and so U(x) > W (x) for all x > y.
(ii) If U(y) ≥ W (y) and U ′(y) ≤ W ′(y) for some y, with at least one inequality strict if
σ˜ = σˆ, then U ′(x) < W ′(x) for all x < y, and so U(x) > W (x) for all x < y.
Proof. I prove part (i) of the lemma. The proof of part (ii) is symmetric and omitted. To
prove part (i), I start by showing that there exists η > 0 such that U ′(x) > W ′(x) for all
13This follows because differential equation (A.1) with boundary conditions in part (i) or part (ii) of
Lemma A1 has a unique solution.
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x ∈ (y, y + η). Since U,W are continuously differentiable, this is true when U ′(y) > W ′(y).
Suppose that U ′(y) = W ′(y). Since U and W solve (A.1) (with parameters (µ, σˆ) and (µ, σ˜),
respectively),
W ′′(y) =
2(rW (y)− µW ′(y))
σ˜2
<
2(rU(y)− µU ′(y))
σˆ2
= U ′′(y),
where the strict inequality follows since σ˜ ≥ σˆ, U(y) ≥ W (y) (with at least one inequality
strict) and U ′′,W ′′ > 0. Since U ′(y) = W ′(y) and U ′′(y) > W ′′(y), there exists η > 0 such
that U ′(x) > W ′(x) ∀x ∈ (y, y + η).
Suppose next that part (i) in the lemma is not true and let y1 be the smallest point
strictly above y with U ′(y1) = W ′(y1). By the paragraph above, y1 ≥ y + η > y. It follows
that U ′(x) > W ′(x) for all x ∈ (y, y1), so U(y1) > W (y1). Note then that
W ′′(y1) =
2(rW (y1)− µW ′(y1))
σ˜2
<
2(rU(y1)− µU ′(y1))
σˆ2
= U ′′(y1),
where the inequality follows since U(y1) > W (y1), σ˜ ≥ σˆ and U ′′,W ′′ > 0. Since U ′(y1) =
W ′(y1) and U ′′(y1) > W ′′(y1), it must be that U ′(y1 − ε) < W ′(y1 − ε) for ε > 0 small, a
contradiction. Thus, U ′(x) > W ′(x) ∀x > y.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (A∗, V1, V2) be an equilibrium outcome. By Corollary 1, for
i = 1, 2 and for all x /∈ A∗i it must be that Vi (x) = E
[
e−rτ(0) (1− Vj (0))
∣∣x0 = x] . By Lemma
A1, for all x /∈ A∗i , Vi(x) solves
rVi (x) = µV
′
i (x) +
1
2
σ2V ′′i (x) (A.3)
with boundary conditions Vi (0) = 1−Vj (0) and V ′1 (−1) = V ′2 (1) = 0. Since Vi(x) = 1−Vj(x)
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for all x, this implies that, for i = 1, 2
rVi(x) =
 µV ′i (x) +
1
2
σ2V ′′i (x) if x /∈ A∗i ,
r + µV ′i (x) +
1
2
σ2V ′′i (x) if x ∈ A∗i ,
(A.4)
with V ′i (−1) = V ′i (1) = 0 and limx↑0 Vi (x) = limx↓0 Vi (x). The general solution to (A.4) is
Vi(x) =
 Cie−αx +Dieβx if x /∈ A∗i ,1 + Eie−αx + Fieβx if x ∈ A∗i , (A.5)
where α = (µ +
√
µ2 + 2rσ2)/σ2 > 0 and β = (−µ + √µ2 + 2rσ2)/σ2 > 0, and where
(Ci, Di, Ei, Fi) are constants. For i = 1, 2, let V
∗
i be the unique solution to (A.4) satisfying
the boundary conditions in the statement of Theorem 1. It can be checked that
V ∗1 (x) =

βe−αx+eα+βαeβx
(α+β)(1+eα+β)
if x ∈ [−1, 0),
1− eα+ββe−αx+αeβx
(α+β)(1+eα+β)
if x ∈ [0, 1],
(A.6)
and V ∗2 (x) = 1 − V ∗1 (x). Note that (V ∗1 )′′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [−1, 0), and that (V ∗2 )′′(x) > 0
for all x ∈ (0, 1] (these inequalities follow since α > 0 and β > 0).
To establish that (A∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) is an equilibrium, I show that, for all x ∈ A∗1, V ∗1 (x) solves
V ∗1 (x) = sup
τ∈T1
E
[
e−rτ (1− V ∗2 (xτ ))
∣∣x0 = x] . (A.7)
The proof that V ∗2 also solves the optimal stopping problem is symmetric and omitted. To see
that V ∗1 solves (A.7), let G2(x) be a solution to the ODE in equation (A.1), with boundary
conditions G2 (1) = V
∗
2 (1) and G
′
2 (1) = (V
∗
2 )
′(1) = 0. The solution to this differential
equation is
G2(x) =
eα+ββe−αx + αeβx
(α + β)(1 + eα+β)
. (A.8)
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Note that, for all x ∈ [0, 1], G2(x) = V ∗2 (x). Consider the optimal stopping problem
G1 (x) = sup
τ∈T
E
[
e−rτ (1−G2 (xτ ))
∣∣x0 = x] , (A.9)
where T is the set of all stopping times. Since G2 (x) = V
∗
2 (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] and since T1 is
the set of stopping times τ such that xτ ∈ [0, 1], G1 (x) ≥ supτ∈T1 E [e−rτ (1− V ∗2 (xτ ))|x0 = x].
Therefore, in order to show that V ∗1 solves (A.7), it suffices to show that V
∗
1 (x) = G1(x).
The function V ∗1 is twice differentiable, with a continuous first derivative. Note that
V ∗1 (x) ≥ 1 − G2 (x) for all x ∈ [−1, 1], with strict inequality for all x ∈ [−1, 0). Indeed,
V ∗1 (x) = 1−V ∗2 (x) = 1−G2 (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, note that (V ∗1 )′(0) = −(V ∗2 )′(0) =
−G′2(0) (the first equality follows since V ∗1 (x) + V ∗2 (x) = 1∀x and the second follows since
G2(x) = V
∗
2 (x)∀x ∈ [0, 1]). Since V ∗1 (x) is convex for all x ∈ [−1, 0) and 1−G2(x) is concave
for all x (see equations (A.6) and (A.8)), it follows that −G′2(x) > (V ∗1 )′(x) for all x < 0, and
so V ∗1 (x) > 1−G2(x) for all x < 0. Finally, note that V ∗1 (x) satisfies
−rV ∗1 (x) + µ(V ∗1 )′ (x) +
1
2
σ2(V ∗1 )
′′ ≤ 0, with equality on x ∈ [−1, 0).
Therefore, by standard verification theorems (e.g., Theorem 3.17 in Shiryaev (2007)), V ∗1 is
the value function of the optimal stopping problem (A.9). Hence, V ∗1 also solves (A.7).
Next, I show that (A∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) is the unique equilibrium. By Proposition 1, any equilib-
rium outcome (A, V1, V2) must have A = A
∗ = [−1, 1]. Let (A∗, V1, V2) be an equilibrium
outcome different from (A∗, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ). The discussion at the beginning of the proof implies that,
for i = 1, 2, Vi solves (A.4), with V
′
i (−1) = V ′i (1) = 0 and limx↑0 Vi (x) = limx↓0 Vi (x). Since
(V1, V2) 6= (V ∗1 , V ∗2 ), it must be that limx↑0 V ′i (x) 6= limx↓0 V ′i (x). Since V1(x) + V2(x) = 1∀x,
there are two cases to consider: (i) limx↑0 V ′1 (x) < limx↓0 V
′
1 (x) = limx↓0−V ′2 (x), or (ii)
limx↑0 V ′1 (x) > limx↓0 V
′
1 (x) = limx↓0−V ′2 (x).
Consider case (i). For every ε ∈ (0, 1] let τ ε := inf{t ≥ 0 : xt ≥ ε} and note that τ ε ∈ T1.
Let V ε1 (x) := E[e−rτ
ε
(1− V2 (xτε)) |x0 = x]. By Lemma A1, for all x ≤ ε, V ε1 (x) solves the
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ODE in equation (A.1) with (V ε1 )
′(−1) = 0 and V ε1 (ε) = 1 − V2(ε) = V1(ε). One can check
that, for all x ≤ , V ε1 (x) = V1(ε)βe−αε+αeα+βeβε (βe−αx + αeβx). Note that (V ε1 )′′(x) > 0.
Let F1(x) be the solution to the ODE in equation (A.1), with F
′
1(−1) = V ′1(−1) = 0 and
F1(−1) = V1(−1). Note that F1(x) = V1(x) for all x ≤ 0. Moreover, since limx↑0 V ′1 (x) <
limx↓0−V ′2 (x), there exists ε > 0 small enough such that F1(ε) < V ε1 (ε) = 1 − V2(ε). I now
use this to show that, for all x < 0,
V ε1 (x) = E[e−rτ
ε
(1− V2 (xτε)) |x0 = x] > E[e−rτ(0)(1− V2(0))|x0 = x] = V1(x) = F1(x).
(A.10)
Note that the inequality in (A.10) implies that V1 (x) is not a solution to the optimal stopping
problem (2). Hence, if (A.10) holds, (A∗, V1, V2) cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
To show that the inequality in (A.10) holds, I start by showing that V ε1 (−1) > F1 (−1).
Note first that it cannot be that V ε1 (−1) = F1 (−1). Indeed, F1 and V ε1 both solve the ODE
in (A.1), with F ′1(−1) = 0 = (V ε1 )′(−1). If V ε1 (−1) = F1 (−1), then V 1 and F1 would both
be the solution to the same ODE, with the same boundary conditions. This would imply
that V 1 (x) = F1(x) for all x ≤ ε, a contradiction to F1(ε) < V ε1 (ε). Suppose next that
V ε1 (−1) < F1 (−1). Since F ′1(−1) = 0 = (V ε1 )′(−1), Lemma A2(i) implies that V 1 (x) < F1(x)
for all x ∈ (−1, ε], which contradicts V ε1 (ε) > F1(ε). Hence, V ε1 (−1) > F1 (−1). Finally, since
V ε1 (−1) > F1 (−1) and (V ε1 )′(−1) = F ′1 (−1) = 0, Lemma A2(i) implies that V ε1 (x) > F1 (x)
for all x < 0.
In case (ii), a symmetric argument establishes that there exists ξ > 0 such that V ξ2 (x) =
E[e−rτξ (1− V1 (xτξ)) |x0 = x] > V2 (x) for all x > 0, where τ ξ := inf{t ≥ 0 : xt ≤ −ξ}.14
Hence, in this case (A∗, V1, V2) cannot be an equilibrium outcome either.
14The symmetric argument for this uses Lemma A2(ii) instead of Lemma A2(i).
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose µ ≤ 0. Using equation (A.6), it can be shown that
∂V ∗1 (0)
∂σ
= −
µ
4e 2
√
µ2+2rσ2
σ2 µ2
√
µ2+2rσ2+rσ2
−1+e 4
√
µ2+2rσ2
σ2
σ2+4e 2
√
µ2+2rσ2
σ2
√
µ2+2rσ2

1+e 2
√
µ2+2rσ2
σ2
2σ3(µ2+2rσ2)3/2
≥ 0,
where the inequality follows since µ ≤ 0. Fix σˆ < σ˜ and let Vˆ ∗1 and V˜ ∗1 be player 1’s payoff
when the volatility of xt is σˆ and σ˜, respectively. By the derivative above, V˜
∗
1 (0) ≥ Vˆ ∗1 (0).
By Theorem 1, Vˆ ∗1 and V˜
∗
1 solve (A.1) on [−1, 0] (but with different values of volatility), with
(V˜ ∗1 )
′(−1) = (Vˆ ∗1 )′(−1) = 0. Moreover, by (A.6), Vˆ ∗1 and V˜ ∗1 are strictly convex for all x < 0.
I now show that V˜ ∗1 (x) > Vˆ
∗
1 (x) ∀x[−1, 0). Note first that it must be that V˜ ∗1 (−1) >
Vˆ ∗1 (−1): if Vˆ ∗1 (−1) ≥ V˜ ∗1 (−1), then Lemma A2 (i) and the fact that (V˜ ∗1 )′(−1) = (Vˆ ∗1 )′(−1) =
0 would imply that Vˆ ∗1 (0) > V˜
∗
1 (0), a contradiction. Suppose next that the set {x ∈ (−1, 0) :
Vˆ ∗1 (x) ≥ V˜ ∗1 (x)} is non-empty, and let z be the smallest point in that set. By continuity
of Vˆ ∗1 and V˜
∗
1 , Vˆ
∗
1 (z) = V˜
∗
1 (z). Since Vˆ
∗
1 (x) < V˜
∗
1 (x) for all x ∈ [−1, z), it must be that
(Vˆ ∗1 )
′(z) > (V˜ ∗1 )
′(z). Lemma A2 (i) then implies that Vˆ ∗1 (x) > V˜
∗
1 (x) for all x ∈ (z, 0], a
contradiction. Hence, V˜ ∗1 (x) > Vˆ
∗
1 (x) ∀x ∈ [−1, 0).
The proof that V ∗2 (x) is increasing in σ for x ∈ [0, 1] when µ ≥ 0 follows from a symmetric
argument (but using part (ii) of Lemma A2 instead of part (i)).
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Let F 2 be the set of bounded and measurable functions on [−1, 1] taking values on R2. Let
‖·‖2 denote the sup norm on R2. For any f ∈ F 2, let ‖f‖ = supx∈[−1,1] ‖f (x)‖2. Fix ∆ > 0
and r > 0. Recall that A∗1 = [0, 1] and A
∗
2 = [−1, 0]. Define the operator ψ : F 2 → F 2 as
follows: for any f = (f1, f2) ∈ F 2 and for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
ψi (fi, fj) (x) =
 e−r∆E [fi (xt+∆) |xt = x] if x /∈ A∗i ,1− e−r∆E [fj (xt+∆) |xt = x] if x ∈ A∗i ,
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Note that ψ is a contraction of modulus e−r∆ < 1. Indeed, for any f, g ∈ F 2, ‖ψ(f)− ψ(g)‖ ≤
e−r∆ ‖f − g‖. Therefore, ψ has a unique fixed point.
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove Theorem 2, I start out assuming that the set of SPE of Γ∆
is non-empty. At the end of the proof I show that Γ∆ has a SPE. Fix a SPE of Γ∆ and let fi(x)
be player i’s payoff from this SPE when x0 = x. Let U =
(
U1, U2
) ∈ F 2 and u = (u1, u2) ∈ F 2
be the players’ supremum and infimum SPE payoffs, so fi(x) ∈ [ui(x), U i(x)] ∀x ∈ [−1, 1].
Note that for all x ∈ A∗i player i’s SPE payoff is bounded below by 1−e−r∆E[U j(xt+∆)|xt =
x], since in any SPE player j always accepts an offer that gives her a payoff equal to
e−r∆E[U j(xt+∆)|xt = x]. On the other hand, for all x /∈ A∗i player i’s payoff is bounded
below by e−r∆E[ui(xt+∆)|xt = x], since player i can always guarantee this payoff by rejecting
party j’s offer. Thus, for all x ∈ [−1, 1] it must be that fi(x) ≥ ui(x) ≥ ψi
(
ui, U j
)
(x).
At states x /∈ A∗i , player i’s payoff is bounded above by e−r∆E[U i(xt+∆)|xt = x], since
player j will never make an offer that gives player i a payoff larger than this. Consider next
states x ∈ A∗i , and note that fi(x) + fj(x) ≤ 1. This inequality follows since the sum of the
players SPE payoffs cannot be larger than what they get by agreeing immediately. Moreover,
by the arguments in the previous paragraph, fj(x) ≥ e−r∆E[uj(xt+∆)|xt = x] for all x ∈ A∗i .
These two inequalities imply that fi(x) ≤ 1 − e−r∆E[uj(xt+∆)|xt = x] for all x ∈ A∗i . Thus,
fi(x) ≤ U i(x) ≤ ψi
(
U i, uj
)
(x) ∀x ∈ [−1, 1].
The two paragraphs above imply that, for i = 1, 2, i 6= j, and for all x ∈ [−1, 1],
U i(x)− ui(x) ≤ ψi
(
U i, uj
)
(x)− ψi
(
ui, U j
)
(x)
≤ max
k∈{1,2}
e−r∆E
[
Uk (xt+∆)− uk (xt+∆) |xt = x
]
,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of ψi. Since the inequality above holds
for i = 1, 2 and for all x ∈ [−1, 1], ||U − u|| ≤ e−r∆||U − u||. Hence, U = u and SPE payoffs
are unique. Let V ∆ = (V ∆1 , V
∆
2 ) ∈ F 2 be the unique SPE payoffs. Since ψi
(
U i, uj
) ≥ V ∆i ≥
ψi
(
ui, U j
)
and since U = u, it follows that V ∆ is the unique fixed point of ψ. Note that V ∆1
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and V ∆2 and satisfy equation (5) in Theorem 2.
The arguments above show that all SPE of Γ∆ are payoff equivalent. I now show that there
exists a unique SPE. Since V ∆1 (x) +V
∆
2 (x) = 1 for all x ∈ [−1, 1], in any SPE players always
reach an immediate agreement, and their payoffs from this agreement are (V ∆1 (x0), V
∆
2 (x0)).
I now use this to construct the unique SPE. Consider the following strategy profile. At every
x ∈ A∗i , player i makes an offer that gives players a payoff equal to (V ∆1 (x), V ∆2 (x)), and
player j 6= i only accepts offers that give her a payoff at least as large as V ∆j (x). The players’
payoffs from this strategy profile are (V ∆1 , V
∆
2 ). Moreover, it is easy to see that no player can
gain by deviating from its strategy at any x ∈ [−1, 1]. Hence, this strategy profile is a SPE
of Γ∆.
Proof of Theorem 3. By equation (5) in Theorem 2, player i’s payoff for all x ∈ A∗i
satisfies
V ∆i (x) = 1− e−r∆E
[
V ∆j (xt+∆)
∣∣xt = x] = 1− e−r∆ + e−r∆E [V ∆i (xt+∆)∣∣xt = x] ,
where the second equality follows since V ∆1 (x) + V
∆
2 (x) = 1 for all x ∈ [−1, 1]. Since
V ∆i (x) = e
−r∆E
[
V ∆i (xt+∆)
∣∣xt = x] for all x /∈ A∗i , it follows that
V ∆i (x) = (1− e−r∆)1{x∈A∗i } + e−r∆E
[
V ∆i (xt+∆)
∣∣xt = x] . (A.11)
Setting t = 0 and solving equation (A.11) forward yields
V ∆i (x) = E
[(
1− e−r∆) ∞∑
k=0
e−rk∆1{xk∆∈A∗i }
∣∣∣∣∣x0 = x
]
=
1− e−r∆
∆
∞∑
k=0
∆e−rk∆Pi(∆k, x), (A.12)
where, for all s ≥ 0 and all x ∈ [−1, 1], Pi(s, x) := E[1{xs∈A∗i }|x0 = x] is the probability with
which player i has proposal power at time s conditional on x0 = x.
For all s > 0 and all x, y ∈ [0, 1], let p(x, y, s) = Prob(xs = y|x0 = x) be the transi-
tion density function of the process xt. It is well known that p(x, y, s) solves Kolmogorov’s
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backward equation (e.g., Bhattacharya and Waymire (2009), chapter V.6),
∂
∂s
p(x, y, s) = µ
∂
∂x
p(x, y, s) +
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂x2
p(x, y, s), (A.13)
with lims↓0 p(x, y, s) = 1{y=x} and ∂∂xp(x, y, s)|x=−1 = ∂∂xp(x, y, s)|x=1 = 0 for all s > 0. Note
that for all s > 0 and for i = 1, 2, Pi(s, x) = E[1{xs∈A∗i }|x0 = x] =
∫
A∗i
p(x, y, s)dy. Since
p(x, y, s) solves (A.13) with ∂
∂x
p(x, y, s)|x=−1 = ∂∂xp(x, y, s)|x=1 = 0 and lims↓0 p(x, y, s) =
1{y=x}, it follows that Pi(s, x) also solves (A.13), with lims↓0 Pi(s, x) = Pi(0, x) = 1{x∈A∗i }
and ∂
∂x
Pi(s, x)|x=−1 = ∂∂xPi(s, x)|x=1 = 0 for all s ≥ 0.15 Note that Pi(·, x) is contin-
uous on (0,∞) (being differentiable). Hence, e−rsPi(s, x) is Riemann integrable, and so∑∞
k=0 ∆e
−rk∆Pi(∆k, x) →
∫∞
0
e−rtP (t, x)dt as ∆ → 0. It then follows from (A.12) that
V ∆i (x) converges pointwise to Wi(x) := r
∫∞
0
e−rtP (t, x)dt as ∆→ 0.
I use the following Lemma:
Lemma A3 For i = 1, 2, Wi (·) is continuous.
Proof. For i = 1, 2 and for every ε > 0, let V εi (x) := r
∫∞
ε
e−rtPi(t, x)dt. Since Pi(t, ·) is
continuous for all t > 0 (being differentiable), V εi (·) is continuous for all ε > 0. To show
that Wi(·) is continuous, it suffices to show that V εi (x) → Wi(x) uniformly as ε → 0. For
any ε > 0 and any x ∈ [−1, 1], |Wi(x)− V εi (x)| = r
∫ ε
0
e−rtPi(t, x)dt ≤ r
∫ ε
0
e−rtdt = 1− e−rε
(since Pi(t, x) ∈ [0, 1]). Since limε→0 1− e−rε = 0, V εi (·)→ Wi(·) uniformly as ε→ 0.
Note that, for all t > 0, P1(t, x) is increasing in x, since player 1 is more likely to have
proposal power at t > 0 if x0 = x is larger. Similarly, P2(t, x) is decreasing in x. Therefore,
by (A.12), for all ∆ > 0 V ∆i (·) is monotone on [−1, 1]. Since Wi(·) is continuous, it follows
that V ∆i (·)→ Wi(·) uniformly as ∆→ 0.
I now complete the proof of Theorem 3. By the arguments above, V ∆i (x) → Wi(x) =
15Since p(x, y, s) satisfies (A.13), for all x ∈ [−1, 1] and all s > 0, ∂∂sPi(s, x) =
∫
A∗i
∂
∂sp(x, y, s)dy =
µ
∫
A∗i
∂
∂xp(x, y, s)dy +
1
2σ
2
∫
A∗i
∂2
∂x2 p(x, y, s)dy = µ
∂
∂xPi(s, x) +
1
2σ
2 ∂2
∂x2Pi(s, x).
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r
∫∞
0
e−rtP (t, x)dt uniformly as ∆→ 0. Integrating by parts, for all x 6= 0
Wi (x) = r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtPi (t, x) dt = −e−rtPi (t, x)
∣∣∞
0
+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
∂
∂t
Pi (t, x) dt.
Note that −e−rtPi (t, x)|∞0 = Pi(0, x) = 1{x∈A∗i }. Hence, ∀x 6= 0, Wi (x) = 1{x∈A∗i } +∫∞
0
e−rt ∂
∂t
Pi (t, x) dt . Since
∂
∂t
Pi(t, x) = µ
∂
∂x
Pi(t, x) +
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
Pi(t, x) for all t > 0 (see footnote
(15)), it follows that for all x 6= 0,
rWi (x) = r × 1{x∈A∗i } + r
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
µ
∂
∂x
Pi (t, x) +
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂x2
Pi (t, x)
)
dt
= r × 1{x∈A∗i } + µW ′i (x) +
1
2
σ2W ′′i (x) , (A.14)
where the second equality follows since W ′i (x) = r
∫∞
0
e−rt ∂
∂x
Pi (t, x) dt and since W
′′
i (x) =
r
∫∞
0
e−rt ∂
2
∂x2
Pi (t, x) dt. Therefore, W
∗
i (·) solves the same differential equation than V ∗i (·) for
all x 6= 0. To pin down the boundary conditions, note that W ′i (x) = r
∫∞
0
e−rt ∂
∂x
Pi (t, x) dt.
Since ∂
∂x
Pi (t, x) |x=−1 = ∂∂xPi (t, x) |x=1 = 0 for all t ≥ 0, it follows that W ′i (−1) = W ′i (1) = 0.
Since Wi(·) is continuous (Lemma A3), it must be that limx↑0Wi(x) = limx↓0Wi(x).
Finally, integrating both sides of (A.14) yields
∫ z
−1
rWi(x)dx =
∫ z
−1
r1{x∈A∗i }dx+ µ(Wi (z)−Wi(−1)) +
1
2
σ2((Wi)
′ (z)− (Wi)′ (−1)).
Note that the two integrals in the equation above are continuous in z. Since Wi(·) is also
continuous, W ′i (·) must be continuous as well, and so limx↑0W ′i (x) = limx↓0W ′i (x).
The paragraphs above imply that Wi(·) and V ∗i (·) both solve the same differential equa-
tion, with the same boundary conditions. Since this differential equation has a unique solu-
tion, Wi(·) = V ∗i (·).
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